Details of Research Outputs

TitleCollusion through Coordination of Announcements
Author (Name in English or Pinyin)
Harrington, J.E., Jr.1; Ye, L.2,3
Date Issued2019-06-01
Source PublicationJOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN0022-1821
DOI10.1111/joie.12199
Published range国外学术期刊
Volume Issue Pages卷: 67 期: 2 页: 209-241
References
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[2] Awaya, Y. and Krishna, V., 2019, Information Exchange in Cartels, (University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, U.S.A.).
[3] Besanko, D. and Spulber, D. F., 1989, ‘Antitrust Enforcement under Asymmetric Information,’ Economic Journal, 99, pp. 408–425.
[4] Besanko, D. and Spulber, D. F., 1990, ‘Are Treble Damages Neutral?,’ Sequential Equilibrium and Private Antitrust Enforcement’, American Economic Review, 80, pp. 870–887.
[5] Chan, J. and Zhang, W., 2015, ‘Collusion Enforcement with Private Information and Private Monitoring,’ Journal of Economic Theory, 157, pp. 188–211.
[6] Chilet, J. A., 2016, Gradually Rebuilding a Relationship: Collusion in Retail Pharmacies in Chile (The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel).
[7] Clark, R. and Houde, J.-F., 2013, ‘Collusion with Asymmetric Retailers: Evidence from a Gasoline Price-Fixing Case,’ American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5, pp. 97–123.
[8] Connor, J. M., 2008, Global Price Fixing, 2nd Edition (Springer, Berlin, Verlag, Germany).
[9] Harrington, J. E. Jr., 1984, ‘Noncooperative Behavior by a Cartel as an Entry-Deterring Signal,’ RAND Journal of Economics, 15, pp. 426–433.
[10] Harrington, J. E. Jr., 2006, ‘How Do Cartels Operate?,’ Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, 2(1), pp. 1–105.
[11] Harrington, J. E. Jr., 2011, ‘Posted Pricing as a Plus Factor,’ Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 7, pp. 1–35.
[12] Harrington, J. E., Jr. and Chang, M., 2009, ‘Modeling the Birth and Death of Cartels with an Application to Evaluating Competition Policy,’ Journal of the European Economic Association, 7 (6), pp. 1400–1435.
[13] Harrington, J. E., Jr., and Chang, M. 2015, ‘When Should We Expect a Corporate Leniency Program to Result in Fewer Cartels?,’ Journal of Law and Economics, 58, pp. 417–449.
[14] Harrington, J. E., Jr., and Skrzypacz, A., 2011, ‘Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices,’ American Economic Review, 101, pp. 2425–2449.
[15] LaCasse, C., 1995, ‘Bid Rigging and the Threat of Government Prosecution,’ RAND Journal of Economics, 26, pp. 398–417.
[16] LeClair, M. S., 2012, ‘Exigency and Innovation in Collusion,’ Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 8, pp. 399–415.
[17] Lubensky, Dmitry, 2017, ‘A Model of Recommended Retail Prices,’ RAND Journal of Economics, 48, pp. 358–386.
[18] Marshall, R. C. and Marx, L. M., 2012, The Economics of Collusion – Cartels and Bidding Rings (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A.).
[19] Mason, C., 2004, The Art of the Steal: Inside the Sotheby’s Christie’s Auction House Scandal (G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, New York, U.S.A.).
[20] Menzio, G., 2007, ‘A Theory of Partially Directed Search,’ Journal of Political Economy, 115, pp. 748–769.
[21] Quint, D. and Hendricks, K., 2018, ‘A Theory of Indicative Bidding,’ American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10 (2), pp. 118–151.
[22] Rotemberg, J., and Saloner, G., 1986, ‘A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms,’ American Economic Review, 76 (3), pp. 390–407.
[23] Schinkel, M. P. and Tuinstra, J., 2006, ‘Imperfect Competition Law Enforcement,’ International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, pp. 1267–1297.
[24] Souam, S., 2001, ‘Optimal Antitrust Policy under Different Regimes of Fines,’ International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19, pp. 1–26.
[25] Spector, D., 2015, ‘Facilitating Collusion by Exchanging Non-verifiable Sales Reports’ (Paris School of Economics, Paris, France).
[26] Sugaya, T. and Wolitzky, A., 2018, ‘Maintaining Privacy in Cartels,’ Journal of Political Economy, 126(6), pp. 2569–2607.
[27] Ye, L., 2007, ‘Indicative Bidding and a Theory of Two-Stage Auctions,’ Games and Economic Behavior, 58, pp. 181–207.
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Cited Times [WOS]:0   [WOS Record]     [Related Records in WOS]
Document TypeJournal article
Identifierhttps://irepository.cuhk.edu.cn/handle/3EPUXD0A/1038
CollectionSchool of Management and Economics
Co-First AuthorYe, L.
Affiliation
1.Patrick T. Harker Department of Business Economics & Public Policy, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, United States
2.Department of Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States
3.Chinese University of Hong Kong School of Management and Economics, Shenzhen, China
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
Harrington, J.E., Jr.,Ye, L. Collusion through Coordination of Announcements[J]. JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS,2019.
APA Harrington, J.E., Jr., & Ye, L. (2019). Collusion through Coordination of Announcements. JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS.
MLA Harrington, J.E., Jr.,et al."Collusion through Coordination of Announcements".JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS (2019).
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