Details of Research Outputs

TitleHeterogeneous suppliers’ contract design in assembly systems with asymmetric information
Author (Name in English or Pinyin)
Lan, Y.1,3; Cai, X.2; Shang, C.3; Zhang, L.4; Zhao, R.1
Date Issued2020-04-05
Funding Project国家自然科学基金项目
Firstlevel Discipline信息科学与系统科学
Education discipline科技类
Published range国外学术期刊
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Document TypeJournal article
CollectionShenzhen Research Institute of Big Data
School of Data Science
Corresponding AuthorZhao, R.
1.College of Management & Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, 300072, China
2.Shenzhen Key Laboratory of IoT Intelligent Systems and Wireless Network Technology, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and The Shenzhen Research Institute of Big Data, Shenzhen, China
3.Department of Computer Science, Aberystwyth University, Wales, United Kingdom
4.School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing, 210093, China
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
Lan, Y.,Cai, X.,Shang, al. Heterogeneous suppliers’ contract design in assembly systems with asymmetric information[J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH,2020.
APA Lan, Y., Cai, X., Shang, C., Zhang, L., & Zhao, R. (2020). Heterogeneous suppliers’ contract design in assembly systems with asymmetric information. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH.
MLA Lan, Y.,et al."Heterogeneous suppliers’ contract design in assembly systems with asymmetric information".EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH (2020).
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