Details of Research Outputs

TitleRepeated Network Games with Dominant Actions and Individual Rationality
Author (Name in English or Pinyin)
Song, Yangbo1; van der Schaar, Mihaela2,3
Date Issued2018-10-08
Source PublicationIEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
ISSN2327-4697
DOI10.1109/TNSE.2018.2874485
Indexed BySCIE
Funding Project国家自然科学基金项目
Firstlevel Discipline自然科学相关工程与技术
Education discipline科技类
Published range国外学术期刊
Volume Issue Pages卷: 6 期: 4 页: 812-823
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Document TypeJournal article
Identifierhttps://irepository.cuhk.edu.cn/handle/3EPUXD0A/760
CollectionSchool of Management and Economics
Corresponding AuthorSong, Yangbo
Affiliation
1.Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Shenzhen CUHKSZ, Sch Management & Econ, Shenzhen 918172, Guangdong, Peoples R China
2.Univ Oxford, Oxford Man Inst Quantitat Finance OMI, Oxford OX1 3BD, England
3.Univ Oxford, Dept Engn Sci, Oxford OX1 3BD, England
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
Song, Yangbo,van der Schaar, Mihaela. Repeated Network Games with Dominant Actions and Individual Rationality[J]. IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering,2018.
APA Song, Yangbo, & van der Schaar, Mihaela. (2018). Repeated Network Games with Dominant Actions and Individual Rationality. IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering.
MLA Song, Yangbo,et al."Repeated Network Games with Dominant Actions and Individual Rationality".IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering (2018).
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